Models that admit only equilibrium solutions are prevalent in neoclassical economics and modern finance. Such solutions lack path dependence and evolve only in reaction to exogenous changes but, worryingly, the stability of these solutions and the nature of any non-equilibrium alternatives are rarely considered. We describe how such equilibrium solutions, and the modeling assumptions underpinning them, can be 'stress-tested' by embedding the models within more general agent-based frameworks that are capable of endogenous, non-equilibrium, dynamics.
I Introduction
All the mainstream schools of economic thought and, in turn, modern finance have been strongly motivated by the mathematical elegance and predictive success of Newtonian mechanics and statistical physics. This has resulted in mathematical models constructed so that the solution is always a unique, stable, equilibrium whose value is both history-independent and a continuous function of the system variables. Indeed the notion of equilibrium has become a unifying concept in modern economics (see [Setterfield 1997 , Kaldor 1972 ) although its precise meaning can vary with context.
In the physical sciences, equilibria are most often studied as the limiting values of dynamical systems where the short-term transient behaviour may not be of interest. However, economic systems have no such end-state and the remaining justification for equilibrium models lies in the implicit assumption that the equilibrating processes operate over timescales shorter than or comparable to any exogenous changes. This implies the system is at all times close to being in equilibrium with its surrounding and is known as a quasi-equilibrium process in statistical physics.
Henceforth we shall refer to an equilibrium solution of a model as meaning one where there is an absence (or complete cancellation) of endogenous dynamics so that the state of the system at any moment is determined solely by the current values of exogenous variables and certainly not, for example, on any prior state of the system. This is indeed the case for gas molecules in a closed box that are reacting to slow changes in temperature -the pressure is determined by the Ideal Gas Law and the current temperature. This happy state of affairs is guaranteed by the Laws of Thermodynamics that provide both a unique statistical equilibrium and a physical mechanism for reaching it.
If the equilibrating processes are not rapid enough then the box can move a long way from equilibrium with its surroundings. However, there is another potential source of disequilibrium in economic systems that can be understood by imagining a box of special molecules that do not obey the First and Second Laws of Thermodynamics (Conservation of Energy and Increasing Entropy respectively). These particles can spontaneously speed up or slow down, reveal a temporary preference for one side of the box over the other, remember where they have been, and (crucially) choose to follow other particles. For a boxful of such molecules there also exist disequilibrating forces that, when strong enough, can destabilize the equilibrium and generate significant endogenous dynamics. We shall use a simple model, with a small number of key observable parameters, to try and quantify the battle between equilibrating and disequilibrating forces in a typical financial market.
Economic systems are aggregations of many heterogeneous agents and the a priori requirement of history-independent equilibrium solutions has profound consequences (see [Kirman 1992] ). Most of these models are generated by assuming that agents display enough homogeneity to be 'averaged' or scaled-up and replaced by a representative agent who is memoryless, perfectly rational (usually in the sense of maximizing some hypothetical utility function) and correct about future expectations. This averaging procedure, when applied to expectations, is known as the Rational Expectations Hypothesis and implies that while individual agents' expectations may be wrong they all use all available information and, on average, agree with the expectations assumption being used with no systematic deviations. 2 In this paper we use a heterogeneous agent model of a financial market to demonstrate that there are significant, systemic, real-world effects that cannot be removed by averaging. As the magnitude of these effects is increased the system remains close to the equilibrium solution but only until a certain (rather low) level is reached. At this point the positive feedback mechanisms are strong enough to counteract any equilibrating processes and the now completely unobservable equilibrium solution is replaced by far-from-equilibrium endogenous dynamics.
As we shall see, for long periods of time the far-from-equilibrium solution may be mistaken for an equilibrium solution reflecting some slow underlying trend until, finally, the endogenous variables suddenly (and unpredictably) shift via a rapid cascade process 3 that cannot be represented by any equilibrium model. To make matters even worse, the boom-and-bust aspect of the endogenous dynamics indicates a high degree of nonlinearity that cannot be replicated by simply linearizing about an equilibrium solution.
The cause of the positive feedback/instability (and thus non-averagability) that we shall consider is herding behavior whereby agents have some additional motivation (ranging from completely irrational to hyper-rational) to prefer the position taken by the majority of agents. While there are many possible causes of herding behavior, the effects should usually be similar and can be modelled very simply using the framework developed in Section II.
Few would argue with the statement that irrational behavior and/or herding are a common feature of the biggest market bubbles and crashes. Yet the question remains as to how such factors affected the workings of a market when, even with the benefit of hindsight, no obvious signs of mispricing were present.
Two previous studies ([ Akerlof and Yellen 1985, Scharfstein and Stein 1990]) looked at the effects of small changes to otherwise maximizing rational behavior. They both showed that even small changes can cause significant (first order) second moments) is normally distributed. The assumption of independence is crucial! 3 See the quote by Alan Greenspan at the start of this section.
changes to the value of the equilibrium. The second study is also noteworthy in that it considered rational herding by investment managers concerned about their relative performance to be the primary source of the deviation. However these analyses were performed within an equilibrium framework and so precluded the possibility of non-equilibrium dynamic solutions. Similarly [Banerjee 1992 ] and [Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992] introduced models of herd behavior via sequential decision-making but again within the equilibrium paradigm.
The modeling framework to be described in Section II was introduced in [Lamba and Seaman 2008b] and [Lamba 2010] and is based upon earlier related models ( [Cross, Grinfeld, Lamba and Seaman 2005 , Cross, Grinfeld and Lamba 2006 , Cross, Grinfeld, Lamba and Seaman 2007 ). The primary motivation for this earlier work was to incorporate various systemic defects such as perverse incentives and investor psychology into an otherwise efficient market and thus establish a causal link between agent behavior at the micro level and the non-Gaussian price statistics observed in financial markets. One clear conclusion was that herding can indeed induce 'fat-tails' consistent with observed power-law decays of real asset price changes. Thus herding is a possible, if not likely, contributor to an extremely important phenomenon that is inconsistent with standard financial models.
The motivation here is different, although the modeling details are similar.
The simulations in Section IV should be considered a 'stress-test' of an extant equilibrium pricing model that is carried out by weakening a particular subset of the assumptions. It is important to note that this allows us to carry over, without any detailed justification, those assumptions from the standard pricing model that are not being weakened.
The paper is organized as follows. The modeling framework is described fully in Section II together with an explanation of how various non-standard motivations, such as perverse incentives and the findings of behavioral economics, can be approximated. Then in Section III the results of numerical simulations are pro-vided for realistic estimates of the model parameters. These demonstrate that the qualitative and quantitative changes introduced by such 'imperfections' are consistent with observations of real markets. Section IV contains the most significant numerical results. Here the herding strength is used as a bifurcation parameter to establish how much herding is required to destabilize the equilibrium market solution. The answer would appear to be far lower than a plausible estimate of herding (both rational and irrational) in actual financial markets. In Section V various links are established between our modeling approach and various concepts from economics and finance as well as the findings of behavioral economics, Soros' theory of reflexivity, and Minsky's theory of financial instability. Conclusions and suggestions for further research are given in Section VI.
II The Model
The simplest, and most common, asset pricing model assumes that the price p(t)
at time t obeys the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
where a and b are the constant drift and volatility of the price per unit time and B(t)
is a standard Brownian motion representing the arrival of uncorrelated Gaussiandistributed information. Equation (1) is justified by positing that new information is instantaneously and perfectly translated into a price change via some equilibrating process. The solution to (1), found using the Itô Calculus, is the geometric
The SDE (1) is highly unusual in that it has an explicit solution. Even more unusually, the solution p(t) depends only upon the current value of B(t) and not the entire history of the Brownian process {B(s)} t s=0 up to that point. Thus the variable p(t) can be considered an archetype for other variables in economic models that are assumed to be the outcome of instantaneously equilibrating processes that are path-independent.
It is more convenient to work with the log-price r(t) = ln p(t) which follows a (non-geometric) Brownian motion. For constant drift a and volatility b the logprice is given by the solution r(t) = at + bB(t) to the SDE
For any given time interval h the changes in log-price r(t + h) − r(t) have a Gaussian distribution N (ah, b 2 h). However this is in very poor agreement with reality. The 'stylized facts' of financial markets (see [Mantegna and Stanley 2000, Cont 2001] ) are a set of statistical observations that appear to hold across all asset classes, independent of geography, history and trading rules. Two are especially important. The first is the presence of 'fat-tailed' price returns whereby the occurrence of the largest price changes (as measured over intervals of hours up to months or years) follows an approximate power-law decay contradicting the exponential decay of Gaussian distributions. Thus the probability of the largest price moves is underestimated by many orders of magnitude. The second phenomenon is volatility clustering, also known as heteroskedasticity, whereby large price moves (in either direction) are more likely to occur shortly after other large price moves.
Without loss of generality, we may choose a = 0 so that r(t) becomes the logprice relative to the risk-free interest rate plus risk premium. We may also, by rescaling time, choose b = 1 and then discretize time so that the solution at the end of the n th time interval of length h is
Almost by definition, the price changes caused by the (exogenous) Brownian information stream η(n) are effected by agents in the marketplace who a) act very fast and b) are motivated by the arrival of new information. The standard argument to justify this perfect information-to-price translation is to suppose that it is as if all agents are continuously, instantaneously and correctly (on average) maximizing their respective utility functions. In reality the presence of transaction costs and the immense computational effort required will mean that trading occurs over much longer timescales, at least for a subset of M agents. We shall call them 'slow agents'. We do not assume that slow agents are of uniform size (in terms of their trading positions) and thus weight the i th slow agent by her size w i and
Note that, in the standard pricing model (4), the market-clearing mechanism is assumed to be efficient and thus the details are unimportant and not specified.
Similarly, here only the slow agents will be simulated below and it is assumed that other 'fast agents' provide sufficient liquidity 4 .
We now make some assumptions that, it must be emphasized, are not fundamental to the modeling philosophy. They merely keep the model simple and are sufficient for the purpose at hand. Firstly, we assume that over the n th time interval the i th slow agents can only be in one of two states, the state s i (n) = +1 meaning that she owns w i units of the asset, and the state s i (n) = 0 meaning that she owns none of the asset 5 . We can thus define the quantity
which is a linear measure of the aggregate demand of the slow agents. Note that σ(n) = −1 when none of the slow agents own the asset, +1 when they all do, and 0 when there are equal numbers in each state. Changes in σ are assumed to affect the log-price in a linear manner (via the change in demand) modifying the 4 The reader is directed to [Lamba 2010 ] for a discussion of how the model can be modified at times of severe market stress when liquidity cannot be assumed. 5 In reality a slow agent may choose to gradually increase or decrease their holdings, short the market, or buy derivatives, but this complicates the dynamics of the slow agents without providing further insights.
discretized pricing formula (4) as follows
where κ > 0 and ∆σ(n) = σ(n) − σ(n − 1). The parameter κ is a measure of the total market depth of the slow agents. Thus one can interpret (5) as stating that price changes have an exogenous component √ hη(n) due to new information, and an endogenous one, κ∆σ(n), caused by internal dynamics.
At this point we note that (4) can be recovered from (5) in two different ways.
We can set κ = 0 so that there are no slow agents (or that they have no effect on the price), or we can suppose that the slow agents are also, on average, always correct and σ(n) = 0 ∀n. In either case the models will generate the same price.
However, the pricing formula (5) allows for the possibility of endogenous dynamics amongst the slow agents affecting the price. Thus (4) can be considered as being embedded within a larger modeling framework which will allow us to test the standard model's sensitivity to nonstandard perturbations.
Finally, we introduce one further generalization of (4) by weakening the assumption that the fast (information driven) agents must always perfectly translate new information into price changes. This is achieved by adding a (for now unspecified) function f (•) that modifies the effect on prices of new information entering the market changing (5) to
with the fast agents acting perfectly if f ≡ 1.
Before continuing, the differences between the fast and slow agents should be clarified, especially since only the slow ones will be simulated directly. In the numerics that follow, h will be chosen to correspond to approximately 1/10 of a trading day. Fast agents include institutions (or individuals) that regularly trade the asset over a timescale of less than a day, and/or are motivated primarily by new information. Slow traders on the other hand will typically shift investment positions over weeks, months or longer.
Equation (6) does not yet constitute a closed system because no rules governing the switching of the slow agents between the 0 and +1 states have been specified yet. There are many types of rule or trading strategy that could be used, involving any desired combination of pure utility function maximization, bonus/commission maximization, inductive learning, imitation among a network of slow agents, technical trading, 'gut instinct', profits, losses, relative performance of other investment options, market volatility, fear, greed, margin calls, the weather, and so on ad nauseam. Prior studies such as the Santa Fe model (see [LeBaron, Arthur and Palmer 1999] ) do indeed use complicated ecosystems of trading strategies and there is much to commend this approach.
We shall use an approach based upon moving price thresholds developed in [Lamba and Seaman 2008b] and [Lamba 2010 ] which is deceptively simple but capable of mimicking various real world influences, market 'imperfections' and psychological biases (see Section A). At the start of the n th time interval, the i th slow agent is represented by its state, 0 or +1, and an evolving open price interval
The endpoints L i and U i are referred to as the lower and upper thresholds respectively. If, at the end of that time interval, the price has crossed either threshold 6 , agent i is deemed to be no longer comfortable with her current investment position, switches states, and the interval I i is updated so that the price is again an interior point. Furthermore, from (6) the action of switching causes a small jump in the log-price of ±2κw i /W .
Each of the M slow agents has their own interval straddling the current price with the price and all of the thresholds evolving at each timestep.
Since the intervals I i are also evolving, it just remains to define the dynamics of the L i and U i . These thresholds for each agent will change (usually slowly)
log−price Agent i is in the +1 state and is represented by the (interval between) the two circles, and agent j is in the 0 state and is represented by the two crosses.
between switchings and correspond to that agent's evolving strategy. Or equivalently the intervals can be thought of as their agents' comfort zones within which that agent is still satisfied with their current investment position. Note that in the case of an algorithmic 'black box' or a hyper-rational utility maximizing investor these thresholds will be consciously/explicitly known by that agent but no other.
A less-rational slow agent may not even be consciously aware of the threshold values but will know when one of them is violated and act to switch.
The state of the equilibrium model (4) at any given moment is completely specified by the current price (or equivalently the value of the information stream B(t)). The situation for the full threshold model is very different. To specify the current state of the system completely requires the additional knowledge of all of the 2M threshold values and the rules specifying their dynamics. These endogenous 'hidden variables' add a great deal of potential complexity to the model but we shall make some simplifying assumptions that appear to be sufficient to address the stability issues at hand.
In order to apply an averaging argument and preserve geometric Brownian motion pricing (4), we suppose that there are myriad influences on slow agents' strategies that can be adequately represented by different (and uncorrelated, independent) geometric Brownian motions applied directly to every agent's thresh-olds. These will be a mixture of purely rational independent analysis, completely irrational thought processes, and mixtures of the two almost certainly in differing proportions for each agent. Each of these influences will move each upper and lower threshold either inwards or outwards, towards or away from, the current price thus making the agent more or less likely to switch states respectively. Thus the threshold dynamics between switchings are given by (7)
The quantity δ i is the volatility of the threshold motion per unit time for the i th agent. Finally, if an agent does in fact switch at the end of a time interval, their threshold values will reset in such a way that is also independent of the other agents. Thus, on average, equal numbers of slow agents will be switching at each timestep and, provided that σ(0) = 0 with identical threshold distributions for the agents in each state at time 0, σ remains close to 0 for all time resulting in the Brownian equilibrium pricing model (4).
To summarize, the model, so far, sits quite comfortably within the neoclassical paradigm. the slow agents may not act instantaneously upon new information but they have differing expectations about the future that are, on average, correct.
We have now, finally, reached the point where we can endogenously perturb the price. To do this we need to include an influence on the slow agents that cannot be averaged away. We posit that agents who are in the minority state (e.g. those who are in state +1 if σ < 0) will, on average, have a motivation to switch and join the majority. Furthermore the pressure to join the majority increases with the magnitude of the difference between the two groups, measured by the quantity |σ|. There are several effects that naturally lead to such a perturbation.
Firstly, any change in σ will lead to a drift in price that may be (mis)interpreted as a fundamental trend with the minority agents reacting accordingly to the price signal. Secondly, there may be 'rational herding' by investment managers, say, who find themselves chasing a benchmark average so as not to lose their jobs, bonuses or investment capital 7 (see [Keynes 1936 , Akerlof and Yellen 1985 , Scharfstein and Stein 1990 . A third cause is the actions of momentum investors who are consciously trying to take detect a nascent bubble as part of their investment strategy. Fourthly, there is the propensity of people, faced with uncertainty, to believe that other people are better informed than they are, or their preference to risk failing conventionally than succeeding unconventionally ( [Keynes 1936] ). Finally, there may be purely psychological effects at work caused by the discomfort of being in a minority, especially within social or professional networks. We shall refer to all the above effects as causes of herding.
For simplicity we assume that each agent reacts to the current value of the aggregate (excess) demand/sentiment, σ, although in reality agents will have different perceived values of this quantity (or may be be reacting, in part, subconsciously). Herding is introduced into the model by supposing that for agents in the minority position only (7) is replaced by
while those in the majority follow (7). Note that the change is simply to suppose that each minority agent has an inward threshold drift added to the dynamics.
Drifting the thresholds inwards (towards the current price of course) reduces the time to the next switching and can be described as the agent's comfort zone being 'squeezed' by the majority opinion. The rate of drift is taken to be proportional to the length of the timestep, h, the magnitude of the imbalance |σ(n)| and a constant C i ≥ 0 quantifying the herding effect for that agent. Note that herding is a positive-feedback effect -as σ moves away from 0 it, at least initially, provides a mechanism for the imbalance to increase. It also provides a (global) coupling mechanism between agents that violates the very strong conditions necessary for the rigorous application of averaging-type simplifications. This completes the 7 These effects will be amplified by the short time-horizons of such evaluation periods. description of the model.
A Justifications for moving thresholds
As mentioned above, once the equilibrium model (4) has been embedded within a pricing mechanism (5) or (6) one can in principle use any modeling paradigm to specify the switching rules of the slow agents. Treating each slow agent as a dynamic interval (L i ,U i ) on the real line (that must at all times contain the current log-price) is certainly unusual and at first may seem highly unnatural. However the use of pairs of price thresholds offers some compelling advantages.
Firstly there is the observation that slow agents react mostly to price changes over longer time periods rather than the arrival of new information. Indeed investment advice and analysis is usually offered in the form of price triggers, as are the outputs of computerized trading algorithms. Sometimes, such as in a margin call, the agent has no choice over the pricing point.
A second important issue is that of transaction (or sunk) costs. These are often neglected under simplifying assumptions but they profoundly change the nature of agents' behavior 8 . Even if one believes that agents are continuously maximizing their utility functions this must somehow be translated into an acceptably small number of trades since a continuous process of incremental adjustments would be ruinous. Provided that switching results in new threshold values that are a non-zero distance away from the current price, then moving price thresholds are a potential mechanism for converting one into the other. The existence of sunk costs is closely linked to issues of hysteresis, memory-dependence and non-reversibility that will be discussed further in Section A.
Finally we turn to behavioral economics. It has already been shown how the 8 It is amusing to note that many of the people who rely on such models are actually paid from sunk costs. And all-too-often the possibility of significant transaction fees can skew the information and research entering the market.
propensity for herding (rational and irrational) can be included by moving thresholds inwards for agents in the minority position. However other effects such as anchoring and loss-aversion can also be replicated. Anchoring is almost automatic as thresholds are reset around the last trading price while loss aversion requires slightly more complex rules involving keeping track of whether agents have made a profit or a loss. An extreme, but unfortunately quite common, example demonstrates the idea.
Imagine an individual who bought a dotcom stock at the height of the tech bubble. Immediately the price goes down but, due to loss aversion which is the emotional difficulty of acting to realize a loss, the lower threshold moves down even faster. It is likely that the upper threshold is moving downwards too but there is never enough of a temporary bounce in the stock price to cause a switch.
Eventually the stock price hits zero without the agent ever selling.
Recent work (see [Kahneman and Tversky 1974 , Rubinstein 1998 , Gigerenzer 2002 , Barberis and Thaler 2003 , Earl, Peng and Potts 2007 ) has suggested plausible heuristics that agents may be using in practice. It should be possible to recreate such rules using moving thresholds and then observe the effects upon aggregate statistics.
B The model as a stochastic particle system with switching and reinjection One does not need to assume that all the slow agents are of equal size, have equal strategy-diffusion, and equal herding propensities. But if one does set w i = 1, α i = α and C i = C ∀i then one obtains a novel particle system simply by defining the position of the i th agent as a particle at position (x i , y i ) = (
2 ) -the x-coordinate is the distance of r(t) from the centre of that agent's interval while the y-coordinate is the semi-width of the interval.
The slow agents/particles move within the set D ⊂ R 2 , D = {(x, y) : −y < x < y, y > 0 (see Figure II) . The M signed particles (with states +1 or −1) move within D subject to three different motions. Firstly there is a bulk Brownian forcing B t in the x-direction that acts upon every particle. Secondly, each particle has its own independent two-dimensional diffusion process. Thirdly, for agents in the minority state only, there is a downward (negative y-direction) drift that is proportional to the imbalance. Figure II: All the M signed particles are subject to a horizontal stochastic forcing and they also diffuse independently. Minority particles also drift downwards at a rate proportional to the imbalance. When a particle hits the boundary it is reinjected with the opposite sign and a kick is added to the bulk forcing that can trigger a cascade (see text).
When a particle hits the boundary ∂D it is reinjected into D with the opposite sign according to some predefined probability measure. Finally, when a particle does switch the position of the other particles is kicked in the x-direction by a (small) amount ± 2κ M , κ > 0, where the kick is positive if the switching particle goes from the −1 state to +1 and negative if the switch is in the opposite direction.
Note that the particles do not interact locally or collide with one another.
In other words, the bulk stochastic motion is due to exogenous noise changing the price; the individual diffusions are caused by strategy-shifting of the slow agents; the downward drift of minority agents is due to herding effects; the reinjection and switching are the agents changing investment position; and the kicks that occur at switches are due to the change in sentiment affecting the asset price via the linear supply/demand-price assumption.
This particle system provides an interesting physical analog for the model and perhaps for economic systems in general. The boom-and-bust nature of the non-equilibrium dynamics described below can be observed dynamically via a browser-based interactive simulation at http://math.gmu.edu/∼harbir/JEICmarket.html.
III Preliminary Numerics
Detailed numerical investigations from a similar model (using two pairs of static thresholds for each agent) are compared against the stylized facts in [Lamba and Seaman 2008a] and further numerical results for a moving threshold model can be found in [Lamba and Seaman 2008b] . Here, for completeness, we provide enough details for replication of the numerical results and sufficient simulations to reveal the nature of the non-equilibrium solution. It must be emphasized that no fine-tuning of parameters is required. Indeed the most significant parameters can be simply estimated and we do so conservatively and as simply as possible.
Firstly, we choose a timestep h defined in units such that the variance of the external information stream B(t) is unity for h = 1. An observed daily variance in price returns of 0.6-0.7% suggests that h = 0.000004 should correspond to approximately 1/10 of a trading day. The price changes of 10 consecutive timesteps are then summed to give the daily price returns.
We next assume that all slow agents have equal weight w i = 1. This could be replaced by a Pareto distribution but we shall not do so here 9 . The behavior of the system is independent of the number M of slow agents (i.e. there exists a continuum limit) with M = 1000 being a lower-bound for representative simulations.
All simulations in this paper will use M = 10000 slow agents.
Next we fix how the slow agents' thresholds are reset after a switching. If agent i switches at a log-price r * then immediately afterwards the interval is reset to
where Z L , Z U are chosen from the uniform distribution on the interval [0.05, 0.25].
This corresponds to an initial strategy that requires price changes in the range ≈5-25% before another switching (although of course the threshold dynamics will alter the strategy as the system evolves). The parameters δ i represent the 'volatility' of each agents independent strategy (or expectations) and we simply assume they are all equal. Note that if δ i = 1 then the volatility of the thresholds is the same as the volatility in price due to the information √ hη entering the system in (6). This is probably too large since the slow agents are not the ones motivated primarily by new information and should alter their expectations more slowly. Thus we set δ i = 0.2 ∀i.
9 It is not necessary to assume that each slow agent corresponds to just one individual or institution -they could each refer to a subset of agents with very similar strategies or propensities.
Finally, for the slow agents, we come to the parameter κ that represents the effect of aggregate slow demand upon the price in (6). A conservative choice of κ = 0.2 means that the difference in price between neutral (σ = 0) and polarized markets σ = ±1 is, from (6), exp(0.2) ≈ 22%.
We now consider the fast agents. The function f (•) was introduced in (6) to modify the effects of the fast agents by assuming that under certain circumstances they do not accurately translate new information into price changes 10 .We shall suppose that at times of extreme market sentiment, when σ is far from 0, excess speculation by fast traders occurs. This may be due to new agents entering the market or by too much attention being paid to new information by traders expecting a market correction. There is some evidence for this (see [Brown 1999] ) and it also helps correct for the fact that in our simple model the slow agents are not allowed to own multiple units of stock. As in previous work on this model the simplistic but plausible choice f (•) = 1 + α|σ| is made with α > 0. We choose α = 1 so that at the most extreme mispricings, new information moves the market twice as much as it would if the fast agents were correctly incorporating it.
It must be stressed that the presence of the function f (•) has no effect upon the main conclusions of this paper and will be set to f ≡ 1 for one of the simulations
in Section IV to demonstrate this. because eventually enough of the majority agents switch position to start a cascade process -as agents switch they cause a change in price (due to the κ∆σ term in (6)) that trips other agents' thresholds and so on. Figure A snapshot of the internal structure of the market is shown in Figure VII . The density of the lower and upper thresholds of each type of agent (0 and +1) are plotted relative to the current price at a moment when σ ≈ 0 (the mismatch between the densities is far more severe when |σ| ≈ 1). The two density plots are not identical (as they were in the initial state) meaning that as the system evolves σ will once again move away from 0 because different numbers of agents will 11 Interestingly there is a very close correspondence between the dynamics of these cascades and Queueing Theory that is described in detail in [Lamba 2010 ]. be switching in either direction. The question that will be asked in the next Section is: how strong must the herding effect be to generate significant endogenous dynamics?
IV Stability simulations
Recall that if all the C i are set to C = 0 then the equilibrium solution is recovered.
We now investigate the manner in which the equilibrium solution loses stability as the herding parameter C is increased from 0. The results are shown in Figure VIII . As can be seen, the equilibrium solution can be considered a reasonable approximation only for C < 5 which is more than an order of magnitude below our real-world estimate C = 100 from Section III.
The loss of stability, measured in terms of the maximum deviation of σ from 0, is gradual and reaches the maximum the system will allow at around C = 40.
A rough explanation of Figure VIII is as follows. The drift in the threshold dynamics of the minority agents is a destabilizing (dis-equilibrating) influence, while the diffusion of the thresholds/strategies and the fact that the majority agents do of course eventually switch out of their position are stabilizing influences. Simple first-exit-time calculations (not presented here) confirm that beyond C ≈ 40 the herding pressure is capable of sustaining the system far from equilibrium for long periods of time. 12 A mathematical treatment of these stability issues will be presented elsewhere.
It might be argued that the presence of α = 0 in f (•) modifies the influence of the fast agents and may be in part responsible for the loss of equilibrium stability. Finally, we consider the parameters δ i that govern the diffusion of slow agent thresholds. In Section III it was argued that this would likely be lower than the price volatility and so was set to δ i = 0.2 ∀i. Figure X sets δ i = 1 ∀i so that the magnitudes are now comparable. By the argument above a larger variance in the agents' (independent) changes in strategy should help mitigate the effects of herding and this is confirmed, although not to any great extent. 
V Connections to economic concepts and other nonequilibrium models
A Equilibria, memory and history-dependence The notion of equilibrium described in the introduction is a strong one, precluding the possibility of multiple internal configurations for the same external parameters. Nonetheless the absence of (non-trivial) endogenous dynamics is a prerequisite for models that are reversible and history-independent with temporary exogenous shocks having no permanent effect.
A key issue is one of memory at the micro-level. If individual agents have no memory then it becomes much easier to assume that they will near-instantaneously reverse their actions and expectations when the external influence is removed.
This type of assumption is crucial in justifying the quasi-equilibrium approach taken in statistical physics. However economic actors are subject to many effects, both rational and irrational, that cannot reasonably be modelled in this way.
Perhaps the most significant of these rational factors is the ubiquitous presence of transaction (sunk) costs (see [Dixit 1992 , Piscitelli, Grinfeld, Lamba and Cross 1999 , Göcke 2002 ). These are expenses incurred that cannot be recouped on reversing the action. As an example suppose that at the current widget price it is not profitable for a manufacturer to have a factory produce the widget. However when the price increases to β (perhaps due to a demand shock) the firm switches a factory over to widget production from something else, incurring costs such as re-tooling and factory down-time. If the price then falls back below β the factory will not immediately switch out of production but rather waits until the price falls below some value α. Thus if one only looks at the current price p and α < p < β it is not possible to know what the factory is producing -one also needs to know which of the threshold values α and β was last crossed.
In the physical sciences this is referred to as hysteresis 13 and the reader is directed to [Cross, Grinfeld and Lamba 2009 ] for a fuller description of the role of hysteresis in economics. The presence of many such factories, all with differing threshold values, results in many possible alternative internal configurations for the same price level. Each of these possibilities results in a different future evolution of the system which now displays both irreversibility and historydependence 14 .
At an abstract level, the thresholds used to describe the slow agents in Section II are a mechanism for introducing memory/history into the modeling process (the fast agents, by assumption, act upon new information and require no such mechanism). As an example, an agent who has been in the minority state for a long time and is influenced by a herding pressure, on average will have thresholds that are much closer together and be more likely to switch in the near future. This information is propagated from one timestep to the next along with the agent's current state.
It is now worth revisiting the concept of equilibrium, allowing for the possibility of multiple endogenous configurations (and dynamics). Saying that the market model simulation from Section III is in equilibrium until just before a sharp reversal is akin to saying that a geological fault-line is in equilibrium until just before an earthquake. This is true, in that there is a balance of both external and internal forces, but the statement that the fault-line is in equilibrium just after the earthquake is equally true. The 'before' and the 'after' can be mimicked deceptively well by unique equilibrium models, but not the transition! 15
The 'balance of forces' notion of equilibrium is not sufficient to guarantee uniqueness when endogenous dynamics are possible, and the system can rapidly move from one internal state to a different one (with lower energy in the case of an earthquake). It is this weaker notion that directs much of mainstream economic modeling -although, it should be noted that multiple equilibrium models 14 When such effects are observed in macroeconomics a common equilibrium-based explanation is the presence of a unit-root since, if a system is only marginally stable it will take a long time to return to its former value after a disturbance. There are standard tests, under assumptions of linearity and the absence of hysteresis, for determining if this might be the case (see [Said and Dickey 1984] ). However marginal stability implies that a system is close to instability and this should be far more worrying to economists than irreversibility. 15 The reader is directed the quote at the start of the Introduction a second time.
do exist in mainstream economics with the initial conditions determining which equilibrium is achieved. However the situation here is far worse -the set of feasible final states cannot be enumerated in advance and depend on the path taken by the process.
B Rational expectations and efficient markets
The consequences of the mainstream acceptance of the hypothesis of memoryfree, efficient, markets cannot be overstated. Although the concepts were introduced by Bachelier in his 1900 Ph.D. thesis, this work was largely forgotten until the 1960s when they became known collectively as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (see [Fama 1965 , Samuelson 1965 , Fama 1970 ). The second class of assumptions relates to the market participants themselves, who are deemed to be perfectly rational, correctly incentivized, and capable of instantaneously incorporating new data into their differing market strategies and predictions. However, heterogeneity of agents (or their expectations) is necessary to ensure that trading occurs in the absence of arbitrage opportunities. Thus the final ingredient in the EMH description is the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) (see [Muth 1961]) stating that the differing expectations driving trades, when used as predictions, are on average correct 16 and do not result in market mis- 16 As opposed to being consistent with the modeling assumptions which is the form of the REH most often used in macroeconomic modeling.
pricing. Additional assumptions, such as the absence of transaction costs, yield the standard formulae used for risk management and derivative pricing which form the bedrock of modern financial engineering ( [Black and Scholes 1973] ). It is this second class of assumptions that are the focus of this paper.
As described in Section II, if one sets f (•) ≡ 1 in (6), C i = 0 ∀i, and further assumes that all threshold dynamics for the slow agents are the result of perfectly rational, independent, utility maximizing behavior (satisfying the REH) then one recovers an equilibrium market following geometric Brownian motion and satisfying the EMH. Once one weakens these assumptions to allow for more general dynamics (and motivations), the moving threshold model can be thought of as a 'perturbation space' within which one can explore the robustness/stability of the default EMH model.
Even if agents are not perfectly rational and other factors influence the threshold dynamics, the pricing should remain correct provided that the REH still holds.
However the presence of just one REH-violating perturbation potentially invalidates its use. As was shown in the numerical simulations of Sections III and IV, real-world effects that induce herding do exactly that, giving rise to price dynamics that differ greatly over long time periods from the equilibrium model by introducing a form of coupling between agents' actions.
Even markets in which irrationality exists can be 'efficient' in the sense that investors cannot earn above-average returns without taking on above-average risk.
Indeed, this is a minimal requirement for any predictive market model (see [Malkiel 2003 ]) 17 . In [Cross et al. 2007 ] it was shown that there is no statistically significant difference between the the investment performance of agents with differing herding propensities C i (and hence nothing to be gained by adaptively changing their reaction to herding). Indeed when transaction costs are taken into account the traders with the highest values of C i , that includes momentum traders, performed 17 The aim of this work is not to show that imperfect markets are inefficient, rather that equilibrium models are fundamentally inadequate.
significantly worse, in agreement with previous studies ( [Odean 1999]) .
One potential criticism of the model is that the fast agents are assumed to be reacting to new information and converting it into price changes. However there may also exist true fundamental fast agents who are aware of the current non-zero value of σ and the correct price and who view this as an arbitrage opportunity. This would act as an additional equilibrating (negative-feedback) mechanism helping to counteract the herding. This brings us to the very important issue of the limits of arbitrage, both in the model and in real markets.
Firstly, as regards the model, σ is assumed to be precisely known by all the slow agents. This is purely for simplicity and agents may have widely-differing perceived values that are only approximately (or on average) correct. Also, it is important to note that no agents are assumed to know the 'correct' geometric Brownian motion price. It is calculated and plotted in Section III but this is only a visual aid -none of the agents are aware of it. As it stands the model is a caricature, albeit one that can be made arbitrarily more complicated and realistic.
As this complexity grows, any potential model-specific opportunities for arbitrage that might exist will reduce and so now we discuss the limits to arbitrage in real markets.
Arbitrageurs and/or fundamentalist investors provide a possible to counteract herding effects. However there are severe limitations in practice. Firstly there is the noise-trader problem (see [Schleifer 2000] and [Shleifer and Vishny 1997]) -arbitrageurs typically have very short time-horizons and mispricings can last a very long time. Secondly there is the existence of speculative traders and short term momentum-traders who may actually make the mispricing worse. Thirdly, it is difficult in practice to be sure what the fundamental price actually is. There is no visible, unambiguous, information stream and all trends may be misinterpreted as rational -especially by those who subscribe to the EMH! Some evidence for this may be found in the wide variations over time of even the most basic measures of value such as the P/E ratio of a stock. This is not to dismiss entirely the possibility that positive feedback effects such as herding can be counteracted. Indeed many, perhaps even the vast majority of, potential bubbles may get deflated before anyone even noticed by arbitrargeurs working as the EMH suggests they should. The point is that it does not happen every time. The stability results to be presented in Section IV should, in this light, be viewed as a preliminary attempt to quantify which effect eventually wins.
C Technical analysis
Given the widespread belief in the underlying notion of (at least weakly) efficient markets, a surprisingly large number of people are employed in technical analysis, looking for exploitable trends and patterns in past pricing/volume data. Some studies, such as [Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron 1992] , claim that the most popular trading rules (based upon moving averages and support/resistance levels) can indeed produce statistically significant profits, even in the presence of transaction costs, while others dispute this (see [Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 1996] and [Malkiel 2003] 
D Soros' Theory of Reflexivity
In [Soros 1987 , Soros 2008 , George Soros introduced his Theory of Reflexivity.
While this is still at the stage of being a philosophical theory, and as yet has had little impact on economics or finance, its relationship to the modeling approach used here (and between its predictions and the numerical results presented above)
is close enough to merit comment.
Soros' theory rests upon two observations. Firstly, human beings are fallible and they may misinterpret an apparent trend, or some fundamental misconception may take hold. This results in investor behavior that is incorrect but in turn induces changes to the market or economic system. Positive feedback effects then cause an increasing mismatch between perception/prices and economic fundamentals that eventually becomes unsustainable and rapidly unwinds.
In the model of Section II, herding provides the amplification mechanism. This is reflexive in the sense that beliefs affect prices, provided κ > 0 in (6). Soros suggests that such processes are commonplace in economic systems and result in far-from-equilibrium dynamics that only become apparent at the very end. This is exactly what is observed in the simulations from Section III.
E Minsky and the financial instability hypothesis
Recent events in financial markets have re-awakened interest in the work of Hyman Minsky and in particular his theory of financial instability ( [Minsky 1992 , Minsky 2008 ). Minsky's work is unusual in macroeconomics in that it places a great deal of importance upon the role of the financial system and debt accumulation. He also stressed, following on from [Keynes 1921 ], the role played by market sentiment (analogous to the quantity σ above), belief under uncertainty, systemic risks and contagion.
Minsky argued that a rising trend in prices (for whatever cause) during a period of relative stability will attract savings and profits leading to further price rises. Gradually there is a reduction in the perceived level of risk that encourages more lending, debt and leverage. Lending standards fall, risk-taking increases, and 'Ponzi borrowers' appear who are relying upon increasing prices to service their debt. Eventually the system becomes unstable, credit tightens, and prices cascade downwards in a 'Minsky moment'.
Minsky believed that such processes were the norm rather than the exception with disequilibrium adjustment mechanisms being insufficient to counteract or prevent them. The resulting dynamics are similar to those observed in the numerics of Section III -there is a long period of apparent trend stability at the aggregate level (whose magnitude and duration are extremely hard to predict) that masks increasing endogenous instability. Then when the process ends it does so very rapidly. Or to put it another way, similar positions develop gradually and then unwind quickly.
There are two ways in which the model presented here relates to the work of Minsky. Firstly, the increasing availability of low-quality credit and lowered perception of risk provide yet another herding mechanism that adds 'fuel to the fire'. Secondly, if one reinterprets the price p(n) in the model of Section II as being a quantity that represents the overall level of, and ease of obtaining, credit (with slow agents being potential lenders) then one has a model that is distinctly Minskian. A more sophisticated model might couple together two such models, one for price and one for credit 18 .
VI Conclusions
The numerical results of Section IV demonstrate that a hypothetical, yet recognizable, equilibrium market model loses stability in the presence of even relatively small herding pressures -whatever their underlying cause may be. Or to put 18 It should be pointed out the model in this paper is symmetric with respect to rising and falling prices, while Minsky's arguments are not. This is not a fundamental problem, however.
it another way, the positive feedback mechanisms caused by herding effects can overwhelm self-correcting equilibrium models. This does not by itself prove that such an instability occurs in any actual market, but there are three observations that suggest this is the case. Firstly, the price statistics of the unstable system are much closer to the stylized facts of financial markets than those of the equilibrium model. Secondly, the model has a very small number of easily-estimated parameters and the observed dynamics hold across a very large region of parameter space. Thirdly, while the model itself is quantitative and new, it shares features with qualitative and long-standing critiques of equilibrium models and neoclassical economics. Hopefully the work presented here will make a useful contribution to the debate.
The mathematical description of the threshold dynamics lies within a new class of stochastic partial differential equations for which closed-form analytic solutions almost certainly do not exist and such models may be unacceptable to many economists. However, the value of such models (and their numerical solutions) in almost every other quantitative discipline is beyond dispute and there is no compelling reason to suppose that economic systems should be an exception.
For example, chaos theory has shown that even very simple dynamical systems, evolving without any external influences, can be inherently unpredictable (except possibly in a statistical sense). Yet, even in the absence of explicit solutions, chaos theory is still capable of quantifying both the probabilities of events and the theoretical time limit on meaningful predictions.
Finally, it is worth stepping back to look abstractly at the process leading from (4) to the full moving threshold model. This started with the embedding of an equilibrium model that implicitly relies upon averaging and/or a representative agent into a larger framework that explicitly allows for the possibility of endogenous dynamics. Crucially, if the rules governing the endogenous agent dynamics were uncorrelated and independent then the aggregate behavior of the system was unchanged. Then more complicated endogenous dynamics were introduced to de-scribe the effect under investigation and these were treated as perturbations to the equilibrium model 19 . Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models may provide an interesting starting point for similar stability investigations as they also rely heavily upon the use of averaging, representative agents and equilibrium. 
